In what follows we shall explicitly and constructively demonstrate the equivalence of the empirical logics (i.e., the propositional calculi) associated with the generalized urn models (GUM) suggested by Ron Wright [1,2], and automaton partition logics (APL) [3,4,5,6,7]. (The result has been mentioned already in [7,p.145], but no proof has been given). The logical equivalence of automaton models (AM) with generalized urn models suggests that these logics are more general and ``robust'' with respect to changes of the particular model than could have been expected from the particular instances of their first appearance.
Let |U| be the number of different types of balls, |C| be the number of different mono-spectral colors, |L| be the number of different output symbols.
Consider the deterministic ``output'' or ``lookup'' function L (u,c)=v, u Î U, c Î C, v Î L, which returns one symbol per ball type and color. One interpretation of this lookup function L is as follows. Consider a set of |C| eyeglasses build from filters for the |C| different colors. Let us assume that these mono-spectral filters are ``perfect'' in that they totally absorb light of all other colors but a particular single one. In that way, every color can be associated with a particular eyeglass and vice versa.
When a spectator looks at a particular ball through such an eyeglass, the only operationally recognizable symbol will be the one in the particular color which is transmitted through the eyeglass. All other colors are absorbed, and the symbols printed in them will appear black and therefore cannot be differentiated from the black background. Hence the ball appears to carry a different ``message'' or symbol, depending on the color at which it is viewed.
An empirical logic can be constructed as follows. Consider the set of all ball types. With respect to a particular colored eyeglass, this set disjointly ``decays'' or gets partitioned into those ball types which can be separated by the particular color of the eyeglass. Every such partition of ball types can then be identified with a Boolean algebra whose atoms are the elements of the partition. A pasting of all of these Boolean algebras yields the empirical logic associated with the particular urn model.
A typical automaton experiment aims at an operational determination of an unknown initial state by the input of some symbolic sequence and the observation of the resulting output symbols. Every such input/output experiment results in a state partition in the following way. Consider a particular automaton. Every experiment on such an automaton which tries to solve the initial state problem is characterized by a set of input/output symbols as a result of the possible input/output sequences for this experiment. Every such distinct set of input/output symbols is associated with a set of initial automaton states which would reproduce that sequence. This state set may contain one or more states, depending on the ability of the experiment to separate different initial automaton states. A partitioning of the automaton states is obtained if one considers a single input sequence and the variety of all possible output sequences (given a particular automaton). Stated differently: given a set of inputs, the set of automaton states decays into disjoint subsets associated with the possible output sequences. (All elements of a subset yield the same output on the same input.)
This partition can then be identified with a Boolean algebra, with the elements of the partition interpreted as atoms. By pasting the Boolean algebras of the ``finest'' partitions together one obtains an empirical partition logic associated with the particular automaton. (The converse construction is also possible, but not unique; see below.)
For the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that every experiment just deals with a single input/output combination. That is, the finest partitions are reached already after the first symbol. This does not impose any restriction on the partition logic, since given any particular automaton, it is always possible to construct another automaton with exactly the same partition logic as the first one with the above property.
More explicitly, given any partition logic, it is always possible to construct a corresponding automaton with the following specification: associate with every element of the set of partitions a single input symbol. Then take the partition with the highest number of elements and associate a single output symbol with any element of this partition. (There are then sufficient output symbols available for the other partitions as well.) Different partitions require different input symbols; one input symbol per partition. The output function can then be defined by associating a single output symbol per element of the partition (associated with a particular input symbol). Finally, choose a transition function which completely looses the state information after only one transition; i.e., a transition function which maps all automaton state into a single one.
From the definitions and constructions mentioned in the previous sections it is intuitively clear that, with respect to the empirical logics, generalized urn models and finite automata models are equivalent. Every logic associated with a generalized urn model can be interpreted as an automaton partition logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton (actually an infinity thereof). Conversely, any logic associated with some (Mealy) automaton can be interpreted as a logic associated with some generalized urn model (an infinity thereof). We shall proof these claims by explicit construction. Essentially, the lookup function L and the output function l will be identified. Again, the restriction to Mealy automata is for convenience only. The considerations are robust with respect to variations of finite input/output automata.
In order to define an APL associated with a Mealy automaton
A=áS,I,O,d,lñ
from a GUM U=áU,C,L,L ñ,
let
u Î U,
c Î C,
v Î L,
and
s,s¢ Î S,
i Î I,
o Î O, and assume
|U| = |S|,
|C| = |I|,
|L| = |O|.
The following identifications can be made
with the help of the bijections tS,tI and tO:
| (1) |
Conversely, consider an arbitrary Mealy automaton A=áS,I,O,d,lñ and its associated propositional calculus APL.
Just as before, associate with every single automaton state s Î S
a ball type u,
associate with every input symbol i Î I
a unique color c,
and
associate with every output symbol o Î O
a unique symbol v; i.e., again
|U| = |S|,
|C| = |I|,
|L| = |O|.
The following identifications can be made
with the help of the bijections tU,tC and tL:
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Another equivalence scheme uses the fact that both automaton partition logics and the logic of generalized urn models have a separating (indeed, full) set of dispersion-free states. (In what follows, the terms ``dispersion-free state'' ``two-valued state'' ``valuation'' ``dispersion-free probability measure'' are synonyms for measures which take on only the values zero and one. We thereby explicitly exclude dispersion-free measures which take on other values, such as 1/2 and 0, as introduced by Wright [1].) Stated differently, given a finite atomic logic with a separating set of states, then the enumeration of the complete set of dispersion-free states enables the explicit construction of generalized urn models and automaton logics whose logic corresponds to the original one.
This can be achieved by ``inverting'' the set of two-valued states as follows. (The method is probably best understood by considering the examples below.) Let us start with an atomic logic with a separating set of states.
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In what follows we shall illustrate the above constructions with a couple of examples.
First, consider the generalized urn model
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| (a) | (b) |
The associated Mealy automaton can be directly constructed as follows. Take tS=tO = id, where id represents the identity function, and take tI(red)=0 and tI(green)=1, respectively. Furthermore, fix a (five×two)-to-one transition function by d(.,.)=1. The transition and output tables are listed in Table 1(b). Both empirical structures yield the same propositional logic L12.
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Now define the following GUM as follows. There are two subalgebras with the atoms 1,2,5 and 3,4,5, respectively. Since there are five two-valued measures corresponding to five ball types. They are colored according to the coloring rules defined above. and L as listed in Table 2.
| colors | ||||||||||
| c1 | c2 | |||||||||
| ball type | ``red'' | ``green'' | ||||||||
| 1 | * | * | * | * | 5 | * | * | * | * | 5 |
| 2 | * | 2 | * | * | * | * | * | * | 4 | * |
| 3 | * | 2 | * | * | * | * | * | 3 | * | * |
| 4 | 1 | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | 4 | * |
| 5 | 1 | * | * | * | * | * | * | 3 | * | * |
There are 14 dispersion-free states which are listed in Table 3(a). The associated GUM is listed in Table 3(b).
| lattice atoms | colors | |||||||||||||||||||
| mr and | a1 | a2 | a3 | a4 | a5 | a6 | a7 | a8 | a9 | a10 | a11 | a12 | a13 | c1 | c2 | c3 | c4 | c5 | c6 | c7 |
| ball type | ||||||||||||||||||||
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 13 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 1 | 4 |
| 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 10 |
| 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 13 |
| 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 13 |
| 6 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 4 |
| 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 4 |
| 8 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 4 |
| 9 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 10 |
| 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 11 | 11 | 13 |
| 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 8 | 11 | 11 | 13 |
| 12 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 13 |
| 13 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 10 | 13 | 10 |
| 14 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 10 |
GUMs and automata are capable to serve as models for particular types of lattices with a sufficient number of two-valued states (e.g., with a separating set of states). Yet it is this very property which makes impossible the realization of other, more exotic states, which have no classical and not even a quantum mechanical counterpart. Take, as an example, the Wright state [1,7] on the pentagon (or any n-agon, with odd n > 3, n=2k+1, k=2,3,¼) Greechie diagram with value 1/2 on the five vertices and 0 on each middle atom (three atoms per subalgebra). The 11 two-valued measures suffice to generate GUMs and finite automata with that logical structure, but none such model realizes the Wright state.